

Remarks

Introduction

This Reply is submitted in response to the Office Action mailed December 17, 2010. After entering the above amendments, Claims 1-6, 10 and 12-16 will be pending and stand rejected.

Claims 7 and 16 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.

Claims 1-7, 10 and 12-16 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0135737 (“Bouthors”) in combination with U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0163540 (“Dorricotts”).

Reconsideration of this application is respectfully requested in view of the following remarks. In particular, Applicant has canceled Claim 7 and traverses the rejections of the remaining claims, namely Claims 1-6, 10 and 12-16.

Response to the 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejections of Claims 7 and 16

Claims 7 and 16 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. In particular, the Examiner rejected the claims for being directed to a “computer product” that was not coupled to hardware (e.g., storage medium or computer).

Claim 7 has been canceled without prejudice.

The computer product of Claim 16 is coupled to hardware, i.e., “a mail server in a local computer network, ... comprising: a plurality of user computers” Claim 16. For at least this reason, Applicant respectfully submits that Claim 16 is directed to statutory subject matter.

Accordingly, Applicant respectfully requests that the rejections of Claims 7 and 16 be withdrawn.

Response to Rejections of Independent Claims 1, 10 and 16

Independent Claims 1, 10 and 16 are generally directed to systems, methods and a computer program product that, after a mail message is not determined to contain any digital signature or is not determined to contain a verified digital signature corresponding to a sender indicated in the mail message, applying a default mail policy to the mail message, wherein the default mail policy: (1) indicates at least one of how and whether a sent message, received from a sender omitted from said list of computer system users, is to be further transmitted across said network; and (2) is more restrictive than each of said sender-specific mail policies.

Bouthors suggests an operator determining the rules that a message must satisfy in order to be forwarded to its addressee. *See* Bouthors, abstract. The rules depend on the sender and the addressee of the message. *See id.* If the sender is not verified, “the message will not be forwarded, that is to say not beyond the operator. IN [sic] this case, server 104 interrupts transmission of the message received in step 201.” Bouthors, paragraph [0040].

As such, Bouthors does not apply any default mail policy, let alone the one recited by Applicant’s independent claims. To the contrary, Bouthors simply interrupts the transmission of the message and terminates all further processing of the message. Therefore, the Examiner’s statement, on page 4 of the Office Action, that “Bouthors teaches a method where if a digital signature is not correctly verified then control logic exists to further process the message” *is false*. Rather than further process the message, Bouthors *stops* processing the message if a digital signature is not correctly verified.

Despite falsely alleging that Bouthors’ suggests “control logic” that is used for “further processing a message” “if a digital signature is not correctly verified” (Office Action, page 4) the Examiner acknowledges that “Bouthors does not expressly teach applicant’s claim limitation element of applying [Applicant’s claimed] default mail policy” (Office Action, pages 4-5). To fill this void, the Examiner refers to paragraph [0003] of Dorricott, and asserts that “Dorricott disclosed message filtering techniques that provided the ability to apply an email filter (i.e., default email policy) to an email such that the contents of the messages are examined.” Office Action, page 5.

The (allegedly) relevant part of paragraph [0003] of Dorricott reads, “Filters are known to check e-mails for spam using several techniques including conventional filters, compliance checking and traffic anomaly detection. For example, filters include software that looks for key words (e.g. XXX, sex, etc.). When a keyword is found the e-mail message is rejected.” As such, paragraph [0003] of Dorricott is merely summarizing message filtering by keywords. Nowhere does Dorricott suggest anything akin to Applicant’s claimed “a default email policy” that is applied to outgoing messages. Moreover, nowhere does Dorricott suggest a default email policy that is “more restrictive than each of the sender-specific mail policies” applied to outgoing messages, as recited by Applicant’s independent Claims 1, 10 and 16.

In summary, Bouthers and Dorricott, taken alone or in any proper combination, fail to show or otherwise suggest among other things, Applicant’s claimed applying of a default mail policy to an outgoing mail message after the outgoing message is not determined to contain any digital signature or is not determined to contain a verified digital signature corresponding to the sender indicated in the outgoing mail message. Moreover, both Bouthers and Dorricott, taken alone or in any proper combination, fail to suggest Applicant’s claimed default email policy (i.e., that indicates at least one of how and whether a mail message, received from a sender omitted from a list of users, is to be further transmitted and that is also more restrictive than each of said sender-specific mail policies). For at least these reasons, the recitations of independent Claims 1, 10 and 16 are not shown or otherwise suggested by Bouthers and/or Dorriott. Therefore, Claims 1, 10 and 16 are allowable over Bouthers and/or Dorriott taken alone or in any proper combination.

Response to the Rejections of the Dependent Claims

For at least the foregoing reasons, independent Claims 1, 10 and 16 are patentable over the Bouthers and/or Dorriott, taken alone or in combination. Since Claims 2-9 and 12-15 depend from and necessarily include all of the recitations of one of independent Claims 1 and 10, the cited documents, whether taken alone or in combination, do not teach or suggest the systems or arrangements of dependent Claims 2-9 and 12-15 for at least the same reasons as described above in conjunction with the respective independent


claims. Accordingly, it is therefore submitted that the rejections or objections of Claims 2-9 and 12-15 have also been overcome and are also in condition for allowance.

Conclusion

In view of the remarks presented above, Applicant submits that the present application is in condition for allowance. As such, the issuance of a Notice of Allowance is therefore respectfully requested. In order to expedite the examination of the present application, the Examiner is encouraged to contact Applicant's undersigned attorney in order to resolve any remaining issues.

It is believed that a one month extension of time and the corresponding fee are required. In the event that any additional petitions and/or other fees are required to allow consideration of this Amendment, such extensions are hereby petitioned under 37 CFR § 1.136(a), and any other fee required therefore (including fees for net addition of claims and/or an extension of time) is also hereby authorized to be charged to Deposit Account No. 16-0605.

Respectfully submitted,



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